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The gap between legislative expectations and actual outcomes is of central importance to the 
legal regime. Much of the work of environmental lawyers involves compliance or enforcement 
efforts, not rulemaking. Even in terms of the issuance of environmental rules, there can be 
substantial deviations between what the lawmaker expected and what actually takes place.
This Article discusses two types of gaps between the statutory design and actual 
implementation. In some situations, something that is legally mandated simply fails to happen. 
Deadlines are missed, standards are ignored or fudged, or enforcement efforts misfire. The result 
is incomplete implementation, falling short of the statutory mandate. For this reason, 
environmental laws often fail to fully achieve the intended outcome. Part II of the Article is 
devoted to understanding the scope of this implementation shortfall and considering possible 
ways of controlling it.
Part III turns to a different aspect of implementation: the ability of agencies and even 
regulated parties to devise new methods of achieving statutory goals that were not anticipated 
by the legislature. For instance, if the designated means of reducing emissions proves 
impractical, the agency may shift to an alternative mechanism. More boldly, the agency may use 
statutory language designed for one problem (conventional air pollution) to address another 
(climate change). This type of creative implementation is different in spirit than the 
implementation shortfalls discussed earlier. What they have in common is that both of them 
differ from the expectations by the statute. 
Mismatches between implementation and statutes produce useful results, but risk doing 
damage to our concept of the rule of law. Widespread noncompliance with formally binding 
requirements undermines the concept that good citizens -- and even more so, governmental 
officials -- obey the law.  For this reason, although it may be socially beneficial in some of its 
guises, creative implementation needs to be held within a reasonable interpretation of the 
statutory language.
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I. Introduction
Over fifteen years ago, I published an article on “slippage” in 
environmental law – a study of the ways in which the actual 
implementation of environmental law deviates from the legislative 
scheme.1) The basic conceptual framework of that article remains valid, but 
there have been important further developments, both in the 
implementation of environmental law and in the available information 
base. Consequently, it seems appropriate to revisit the topic with an eye to 
those developments, including the expanded body of scholarship on 
implementation issues.2) 
As I explained in the earlier article, there are gaps between the “law on 
the books” and the “law in action” in all areas of law, but in environmental 
law the gap is particularly striking.3) Although the discrepancy is surely no 
secret, the core focus of environmental scholarship in the U.S. has been on 
the federal standards governing pollution, hazardous waste, and 
preservation of wilderness and wildlife. The essential picture of regulation 
in much of the environmental literature is that Congress passes a law, the 
1) Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously, 23 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 297 (1999). I am 
grateful for the invitation of the organizers of the Pathways conference to revisit the subject of 
that article.
2) Among the many important contributions to the recent literature, LeRoy C. Paddock 
and Jessia A. Wentz (eds.), Next Generation Environmental Compliance and Enforcement 
(2014), and David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 
N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2014), provide particularly useful overviews.
3) Thomas McGarity suggests that political polarization has also resulted in more overly 
political and aggressive efforts to manipulate the implementation process. See Thomas 
McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 Duke L.J. 
1671 (2012). I will not address that issue in this paper, though his view does not seem 
implausible.
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federal government implements the program (usually through 
rulemaking), and compliance follows in due course. Of course, it is 
common knowledge that this story is incomplete because of the 
unpredictability of the implementation process. Nevertheless, this does 
remain the dominant intellectual paradigm. 
This picture undoubtedly contains much truth and deserves the serious 
attention it has received. Nevertheless, this conventional picture seriously 
distorts the realities of the present system. The gap between legislative 
expectations and actual outcomes is of central importance in the legal 
regime. Much of the work of environmental lawyers involves compliance 
or enforcement efforts, not rulemaking. Even in terms of the issuance of 
environmental rules, there can be substantial deviations between what 
Congress expected and what actually takes place.
It is not clear whether the implementation challenge is greater in 
environmental law than other areas of government regulation, but there are 
some plausible reasons why that could be true. To begin with, the federal 
statutes set high goals in a period when environmental protection was 
widely seen by the public as a high priority. Some of those goals were 
unrealistic even at the time. Furthermore, the political consensus did not 
last, and beginning with Reagan’s election in 1980, environmental 
regulation has been sharply adversarial. Enforcement and rulemaking 
efforts have been attractive for opponents who were unable to roll back the 
statutes themselves. Moreover, the increasing gridlock since 1980 has 
largely blocked new legislation, leaving the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) with the task of adapting existing statutes to new challenges 
such as climate change through the administrative process. Finally, 
environmental laws rely heavily on cooperation between state and federal 
agencies, and states have differed widely in their willingness to support 
implementation of federal law. State pushback has become stronger over 
time due to political polarization. Whatever the reason, the “disconnect” 
between the statutes and the reality of implementation has been substantial 
and persistent.
In this article, I will discuss two types of gaps between the statutory 
design and actual implementation. In some situations, something that is 
legally mandated simply fails to happen. Deadlines are missed, standards 
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are ignored or fudged, or enforcement efforts misfire.4) Perhaps this 
phenomenon escapes notice because we are more likely to focus our 
attention on what is happening than on what is not. Part II is devoted to 
understanding the scope of this implementation shortfall and considering 
possible ways of controlling it.5)
Part III turns to a different aspect of implementation: the ability of 
agencies and even regulated parties to devise new methods of achieving 
statutory goals that were not anticipated by the legislature. This type of 
creative implementation is different in spirit than the implementation 
shortfalls discussed earlier. In practice, however, the difference is not 
necessarily clear-cut. In some cases, the statutory goals may be subject to 
debate or it may not be clear whether a program in fact has a positive or 
negative impact on achieving those goals. Still, the difference is between 
failed implementation and what one might call creative implementation. 
What they have in common is that both of them differ from the 
expectations of the legislature. 
The implementation gap should not be exaggerated, and we should not 
overlook the substantial extent to which the system operates as planned. 
Genuine compliance and straightforward implementation are also 
important parts of the picture. Yet, we also seriously misunderstand the 
regulatory system if we ignore the pervasive effect of implementation 
issues on the system as a whole. The problem of obtaining compliance with 
environmental mandates is pervasive. So is the problem of achieving 
statutory goals when unexpected difficulties arise. Although scholarly 
attention to such implementation issues has increased in recent years, they 
still receive less attention than they deserve.
4) One reason is budgetary. As Joel Mintz puts it, “[o]ne area in which… the U.S. 
approach to environmental enforcement has been consistently inadequate is Congress’s 
allocation of staff and financial resources for EPA’s enforcement program.” Joel A. Mintz, 
Assessing National Environmental Enforcement: Some Lessons from the United States’ Experience, 26 
Geo. Int’l Env. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2013).
5) The implicit assumption, of course, is that environmental regulations are socially 
beneficial and that greater compliance is socially desirable, a point on which not everyone 
might agree.
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II. Implementation Shortfalls
As we will see in this section, there are conspicuous shortfalls in 
compliance with environmental statutes. It is important, however, to keep 
these shortfalls in perspective. U.S. environmental regulations have 
resulted in notable advances in environmental quality.6) At the same time, 
however, there have been unanticipated delays and areas of weak 
implementation, resulting in slower and more erratic progress than we 
might otherwise have seen. These problems are so widespread that they 
cannot be considered aberrational.
1. Failures and Delays in Implementation
According to an old saying, “there is many a slip between cup and lip.” 
In this section, we consider two ways that implementation can go awry: 
either through failure by the regulatory bodies themselves to comply with 
statutory mandates or failure by the regulated firms to do so. 
1) Deadline Violations
Congressional regulatory mandates sometimes follow a notorious 
pattern. New statutes or amendments are passed, with much fanfare. EPA 
or some other regulator is directed to issue new rules before some deadline, 
often less than a year away. Time comes and goes, but no agency action is 
forthcoming. Often the agency is unable to comply because of insufficient 
information or budget shortfalls; sometimes it simply chooses not to 
comply for political reasons or because it believes the mandate is 
unworkable. For instance, under the 1972 Clean Water Act, EPA was 
supposed to issue certain water pollution regulations within a year,7) but 
6) For a vivid illustration, see the graph showing the substantial decrease in air pollution 
from 1980 to 2014 in https://www3.epa.gov/airtrends/images/inNAAQS19802014_ 
20150923.png.
7) See CWA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (requiring EPA to issue effluent limitation 
guidelines within one year of October 18, 1972).
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some important rules were not issued until 19878) and the process was not 
complete until 1990.9) 
A more recent example is provided by legislation relating to food safety. 
After President Obama signed food safety reforms at the beginning of 2011, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had one year to propose safety 
requirements for producing and harvesting farm produce, among other 
mandates. The FDA did manage to complete drafts of two proposed rules 
before the Act’s deadline. After much delay by White House staff,10) the 
FDA formally proposed the revised versions on January 4, 2013, exactly a 
year later than the statutory deadline.11) The FDA had also missed other 
deadlines under the Act, prompting a district court judge a few months 
later to order the agency to propose new deadlines it would meet.12) This 
was not the last of the delays. By early 2014, the FDA had proposed most of 
the required rules, but there were continuing delays in proposing others. 
The FDA agreed with the plaintiffs on a new schedule for issuing many of 
the final regulations by 2017.13) If this schedule is kept, it will mean that 
most but not all of the rules will be out within five years of the statutory 
deadline.
A careful empirical study across multiple administration agencies 
provides a firmer basis for generalizing the operation of regulatory 
deadlines.14) The study identified almost 2500 regulations from 1987 to 2003 
8) Env. Rep., Nov. 13, 1987, at 1736.
9) Rybachek v. Alask Miner’s Ass’n, 904 F.2d 1276 (1990). As a result of such delays, many 
permits were issued in the meantime without the benefit of the mandated EPA regulations 
based on the best judgment of individual state officials on feasible pollution reductions. See 
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 Env. 
L. 1647 (1991).
10) See Helena Bottemiller, Documents Show OMB Weakened FDA’s Food Safety Rules, Food 
Safety News, March 25, 2013.
11) Food and Drug Administration, FDA Proposes New Safety Standards for Foodborne 
Illness Prevention and Produce Safety (Jan. 4, 2013). 
12) Food Safety v. Hamburg, No. 12-cv-04529 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013). The court 
approved the FDA’s new deadlines in June. 
13) Renée Johnson, “Food Safety Issues for the 114th Congress” 10 (Feb. 13, 2015) 
(Congressional Research Service).
14) Gersen and O’Connell, Statutory Deadlines. The empirical findings are found in id. at 
937-949, with more details in the tables at the end of the article.
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involving statutory deadlines and about 15% of them involved judicially 
imposed deadlines.15) Deadlines are associated with a shorter regulatory 
process, but to a surprisingly modest extent. Controlling for other 
differences, there was a 57% chance that a rulemaking with a deadline 
would end before a similar rulemaking with no deadline.16) At EPA, for 
example, the average duration of rulemakings without deadlines was 685 
days; the presence of a deadline reduced the length to an average of 610 
days or by only about 10%.17) If not wholly irrelevant, rulemaking deadlines 
seem to be a good deal less motivating than one might have expected.
Other deadlines involve state governments’ issuance of environmental 
compliance plans or other regulations or achieving environmental goals by 
the deadlines imposed by Congress. In theory, EPA has complete control 
over laggard states in this system, because it can disapprove a state plan, 
impose its own program, or even rescind the delegation to a state entirely. 
Thus, in theory, states that lag behind should be swiftly shouldered aside. 
But this threat is not altogether credible because taking over a state 
program is very costly for EPA.18) As a practical matter, EPA needs the 
active participation of state governments for the program to succeed; it 
simply does not have the resources to implement federal environmental 
statutes on its own.19) Minor conflicts with state agencies can be resolved 
simply through the exercise of EPA’s authority, but major disputes may 
require EPA to negotiate with the states in order to obtain their 
cooperation.20) As a result, “the states have been able to work compromises 
with EPA rather than be slavishly subject to federal dictates.”21)
Because of these dynamics, federal air pollution deadlines have served 
as the bases for rounds of negotiation and increasingly stringent restrictions 
15) Id. at 983 Table 4, 
16) The percentage is derived from the 1.37 to 1 odds given in id. at 949.
17) Id. at 988 Table 12.
18)See Victor Flatt, A Dirty River, Runs Through It: The Failure of Enforcement of the Clean 
Water Act, 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1997).
19) John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L Rev. 1183. 1218 
(1995). 
20) Id. at 1224.
21) Id.
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on states.22) As originally enacted in 1970, the Clean Air Act required states 
to achieve national air quality standards in five years, which Congress 
extended for two years (ten years years in some areas). In 1990, Congress 
yet again extended the compliance period. Despite the frustrations and 
delays involved in this process, air quality has improved substantially and 
retrospective studies show that the benefits have far exceeded the costs.23) 
Still, the original statute with its strict deadlines provides no clue of the 
complex minuet of deadlines, delays, and renegotiation that actually 
resulted.
2) Non-Compliance by Sources
It would be grossly inaccurate to say that the federal environmental 
statutes are a dead letter. Obviously, they are not. They have resulted in 
dramatic improvements in air and water pollution in many parts of 
America.24) But it is equally obvious that translating legal mandates into 
physical compliance is far from automatic. The problem is not limited to air 
pollution. Implementation of the Clean Water Act received considerable 
attention before the close of the last century, with discouraging findings. 
Twenty years after passage of the statute, roughly ten thousand discharges 
still had no permits whatsoever, 12-13% percent of major private and 
municipal sources were in a ”Significant Noncompliance” status during a 
single three-month period alone, and another 5% avoided that status only 
because they were already on extended compliance schedules.25) Other 
studies showed considerable variation in compliance levels between 
states.26) EPA’s inspector general also documented widespread shortfalls in 
state enforcement,27) and even disparities between states in which EPA 
22) The account in this paragraph and the next one is drawn from Daniel A. Farber and 
Ann E. Carlson, Environmental Law: Cases and Materials 420-422 (9th ed., 2014).
23) This is not to say, of course, that some other approach might not have produced the 
same benefits more quickly or cheaply.
24) For an overview of enforcement mechanisms, see Robert Esworthy, Federal Pollution 
Control Laws: How Are They Enforced? (Congressional Research Service, 2014).
25) See Robert W. Adler et al., The Clean Water Act: 20 Years Later 147-167 (1993), for the 
sources of these figures. 
26) See Victor Flatt, supra note 20.
27) John Cushman, EPA and States Found to Be Lax on Pollution Law, NY Times, June 7, 
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rather than the state is in charge of enforcement.28) These studies may 
exaggerate the significance of non-compliance because they do not take into 
account the seriousness of the violation.29) Still, these figures were cause for 
serious concern.
Unfortunately, environmental enforcement problems seem to have 
continued into this century. In terms of EPA performance, according to one 
summary of the available evidence:
The Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), EPA’s Office of 
Inspector General (“OIG”), EPA’s Administrator, and EPA’s own 
enforcement office have all offered highly critical assessments of 
EPA’s performance in promoting compliance with environmental 
regulatory requirements. In a December 2012 report, for example, the 
GAO noted that “[i]n recent years, EPA has reported that it is not 
achieving all of the environmental and public health benefits it 
expected in regulating certain entities because of substantial rates of 
noncompliance in some programs.” Compounding the challenge in 
inducing compliance at desired levels is the enforcers’ ignorance of 
the scope of the problem they are addressing. As the GAO also 
noted, “[B]ecause of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in 
some programs…EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities’ 
compliance.”30)
Enforcement by states has also continued to fall short of expectations, 
including:
1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/07/us/epa-and-states-found-to-be-lax-
on-pollution-law.html?pagewanted=all.
28) For a detailed description of the enforcement process, see Joseph F. Guida and Jean M. 
Flores, From Here to A Penalty: Anatomy of EPA Civil Administrative Enforcement, 43 Tex. Envtl. 
L.J. 129 (2013). For a striking failure of implementation by the state which was only belatedly 
corrected by EPA oversight, see Mary Tiemann, Lead in Flint, Michigan’s Drinking Water: 
Federal Regulatory Role, CRS Insights (March 2, 2016), available at https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/IN10446.pdf. 
29) See Joel A. Mintz, Measuring Environmental Enforcement Success: The Elusive Search for 
Objectivity, 44 Env. L. Rev. 10751 (2014). Mintz discusses possible improved metrics. See id. at 
10754-55.
30) Markell and Glicksman, supra note 5, at 45.
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•  Widespread and persistent data inaccuracy and incompleteness 
in national data systems, which make it hard to identify when 
serious problems exist or to track state actions;
•  Routine failure of states to identify and report significant 
noncompliance;
•  Routine failure of states to take timely or appropriate 
enforcement actions to return violating facilities to compliance, 
potentially allowing pollution to continue unabated; and
•  Failure of states to take appropriate penalty actions, which 
results in ineffective deterrence for noncompliance and an 
unlevel playing field for companies that do comply.31)
The upshot is that, as EPA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) has 
found, “state enforcement programs frequently do not meet national 
enforcement goals.”32) Some of the defects in state performance were 
particularly troubling:
The OIG found that during fiscal years 2003 to 2009, “…
performance was low across the board,” with some states 
performing far below average. For example, EPA established a 
national goal that states inspect 100% of major CAA emitters every 
two years, but the Inspector General found that only eight states met 
that goal. As of 2009, EPA set a national goal that states inspect 100% 
of CWA major permit holders every two years, but in 2010, only two 
states met that goal, the national average was only 61%, and thirteen 
states inspected fewer than 50% of major facilities.33)
It is important to keep defects in enforcement in perspective. They 
indicate a troubled but not impotent enforcement system. Despite the 
31) Id. at 47-48.
32) Id.
33) Id. at 48.  For more recent discussion of some of the weaknesses of the implementation 
process, see David L. Markell and Robert L. Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and 
Application, Part I (2016), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2734204 (forthcoming in the 
Arizona Law Review).
 The Implementation Gap in Environmental Law   |  13No. 1: 2016
unevenness discussed above, enforcement is often vigorous and effective. 
For instance, EPA summarized its 2015 enforcement record as resulting in 
$7 billion in investments by companies in compliance and cleanup 
measures; $404 million in penalties; $39 million for environmental 
mitigation projects (discussed in Part III); and 129 combined years of 
incarceration for sentenced defendants.34) EPA reported that its enforcement 
actions that year resulted in reductions of 215,000 tons of air pollutants and 
46,000 pounds of water pollution.35) No doubt, the figures would be 
considerably higher if state enforcement actions were added. Thus, 
enforcement is by no means a paper tiger. It falls far short of reaching all 
violations, leaving many pollution sources out of compliance. The next 
section considers ways in which the level of compliance could be increased.
2. Improving Compliance
One of the distinctive features of U.S. environmental law is the use of 
citizen suits for enforcement purposes.36) Available remedies include an 
injunction against noncompliance, an order requiring the defendant to pay 
civil penalties to the government, and attorneys fee. These citizen suit 
provisions may authorize “any person” to commence an action against a 
violator. They require plaintiffs to give notice, usually sixty days, to the 
alleged violator and to federal and state authorities prior to filing suit. Most 
of the statutes specify that if federal or state authorities are diligently 
prosecuting compliance actions, citizen suits are barred, though citizens are 





36) See, e.g., § 304 of the Clean Air Act, § 505 of the Clean Water Act, § 18 of the Toxic 
Substances Control Act (TSCA), § 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), § 326 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, § 11(g) of the 
Endangered Species Act, and § 310 of CERCLA. An exception is the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which does not authorize citizen suits.
37) For an introduction to the topic and a defense of citizen suits, see Mark Seidenfeld and 
Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People”: Citizen Participation in Environmental 
Enforcement, 73 Geo. L. Rev. 269 (2005).
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Empirical evidence about the effectiveness of citizen suits is limited, but 
the existing evidence does suggest that they improve environmental 
compliance. A recent study by the Center for Law, Energy, and 
Environment at Berkeley found that citizen suits against municipal waste 
treatment facilities led to settlements that resulted in improvements in 
environmental quality.38) Another study, this time of citizen suits under the 
Endangered Species Act, found that the suits led to protection for species 
that were as in need of protection as those that the agency chose, thereby 
augmenting the statute’s protection.39)
Although the citizen suit technique has proved effective, it might be 
even more useful if the Supreme Court had not placed restrictions on the 
ability of plaintiffs to bring these suits40) and on the availability of attorneys’ 
fees.41) Perhaps it is not too late to reconsider some of these limiting 
decisions. In addition, although some states already allow citizen suits to be 
brought in their own courts,42) states might consider expanding this option.
Transparency can also be useful in curbing violations. EPA formerly 
had a practice of publicizing each stage of an enforcement action, and these 
routine press releases often received attention from local media in the 
vicinity of the violation and “were widely viewed as having a meaningful 
deterrent impact on existing and would-be environmental violators.”43) 
Today, EPA is once again exploring methods for greater transparency, 
including on-line reporting of real-time monitoring data and other forms of 
38) Nell Green Nylen, Luke Sherman, Michael Kiparsky, and Holly Doremus, Citizen 
Enforcement and Sanitary Sewer Overflows in California (2016), available at https://www.law.
berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CLEE_CitizenEnforcementSSOs_2016-04-11.
pdf.
39) Eric Biber and Berry Brosi, Citizen Involvement in the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 337 
Science 802 (2012).
40) See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (requiring strict compliance 
with time limits for notice of intent to file suit); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 
523 U.S. 83 (1998) (no jurisdiction if defendant complies after receiving notice of intent to file 
suit)
41) See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dept. of Health, 532 U.S. 598 
(2001) (precluding fees where the defendant alters behaviors without formal court order).
42) See James R. May, The Availability of State Environmental Citizen Suits, 18 Nat. Res. & 
Env. 53 (Spring 2004).
43) Joel A. Mintz, Shaping Next Generation Compliance at EPA: Lessons from the Agency’s Past 
and Some Post-Workshop Thoughts, in Paddock and Wentz, supra note 3, at 330.
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e-reporting that make information available to the public.44)
One aspect of enforcement that has become clear is the need to focus on 
small, dispersed sources that may cumulatively cause major problems: 
[W]hen EPA developed its enforcement policies, it focused 
primarily on the largest (or major) facilities with individual permits 
that are in significant noncompliance. But EPA had found a rate of 
serious noncompliance at about forty-five percent of smaller 
facilities. EPA had further concluded that “[i]t is likely that these 
smaller but more numerous sources are of critical concern, especially 
where there are clusters of permitted facilities around impaired 
waters.”45)
These small, dispersed sources can also be major contributors to toxic 
air pollutants.46) EPA has also explored communication strategies in some 
industries with numerous small emitters. Rather than seek enforcement, 
EPA simply sent letters to firms with suggestions about low-cost methods 
of compliance; the letters were inexpensive but produced noticeable 
results.47)
As this example indicates, there has also been considerable interest in 
use of cooperative compliance strategies.48) There are a number of economic 
44) Cynthia Giles, New Generation Compliance, in Paddock and Wentz, supra note 3, at 
4-7, 15, 18. For instance, EPA has deployed solar-powered monitors that can upload data via 
cell phones and infrared cameras that allow it to identify release plumes. Id. at 15. This seems 
to be a very promising development: “[t]he advent of low-cost, tamper-proof, real-time 
monitors that regularly transmit data to regulators holds great promise, as do remote sensing 
technologies.” James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl, and Jonathan Nash, Environmental Law in Austerity, 
32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 481, 487 (2015).
45) Markell and Glicksman, supra note 3, at 64.
46) For further discussion, see Daniel A. Farber, Controlling Pollution by Individuals and 
Other Dispersed Sources, 35 Env. L. Rep. 10745 (2005).
47) Id. at 329. There is some empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of 
enforcement techniques that rely on cooperation rather than coercion. See Dietrich H. 
Earnhart and Robert L. Glicksman, Coercive vs. Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of Enforcement 
Approach on Environmental Management, 42 Int’l Rev. of L. & Econ. 135 (2015). For additional 
thoughts on cooperative compliance strategies, see Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of 
Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of Environmental Protection, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 61 (2000).
48) See Glicksman and Earnhart, supra note 45, at 79. For definitions of these enforcement 
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reasons for some firms to comply voluntarily, or even go beyond strict legal 
requirements, such as a desire to improve brand image, avoid potential 
future litigation or penalties, or attract investors by signaling effective risk 
management systems.49) The empirical evidence on the relative 
effectiveness of these two enforcement strategies is mixed.50) Regulators 
seem to use a mix of these strategies; for instance, a study of chemical 
manufacturing facilities found that 39% of firms reported cooperative 
attitudes with regulators.51) The same study found that firms were more 
likely to employ stringent internal monitoring when subject to more 
cooperative enforcement, with little difference in other compliance 
activities between cooperative and adversary enforcement.52) Another 
recent study finds a complex interplay between self-auditing, cooperative 
relationships with regulators, and agency enforcement and monitoring 
stringency.53)
strategies, see id. at 79-80. A related topic is the widespread use of voluntary compliance 
measures, as described in Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: 
Lessons from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 3 
(2014). Coglianese and Nash did not find evidence of success for one of EPA’s flagship 
voluntary programs, the “performance track” effort to reward companies that exhibit strong 
environmental performance. Id. at 8. They concluded that the program did not in fact attract 
top performers, id. at 46, and that program growth was unlikely because higher rewards were 
linked with increasingly stringent entry requirements. Id. at 79-80. They did find, however, 
that the program allowed EPA to gain a better understanding of firm behavior, which was 
useful in designing other programs:
To at least some degree, Performance Track apparently did help EPA officials 
better understand the role of environmental management systems in 
environmental protection. After visiting Performance Track facilities and observing 
how EMSs worked in practice, EPA learned that EMSs that were not externally 
certified tended to diminish in quality. Hence, the agency added a requirement for 
facilities participating in Performance Track to have their EMSs certified by a third 
party.
Id. at 85.
49) See id. at 85; LeRoy C. Paddock, Beyond Deterrence: Compliance and Enforcement in the 
Context of Sustainable Development, in Paddock and Wentz, supra note 3, at 121, 126-131.
50) For a review of the literature, see Glicksman and Earnhart, supra note 45, at 89-91.
51) Id. at 99.
52) Id. at 104.
53) Dietrich Earnhart and Robert Glicksman, Extent of Cooperative Enforcement: effect of the 
Regulator-Regulated Facility Relationship on Audit Frequency, 5 Strategic Behavior & the 
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Empirical research in this area is hampered by lack of data and by the 
likelihood that regulators may adjust their enforcement strategies based on 
the compliance activities of companies, so that high compliance may result 
in cooperative relationships rather than vice versa. Indeed, some 
enforcement systems explicitly tie external monitoring and enforcement 
strategies to the quality of a firm’s compliance management.54)
Another approach is to make use of third-party certification efforts.55) 
According to one recent observer, “[w]hile not an entirely new practice, 
third-party verification seems to be increasingly attractive to Congress and 
federal agencies in light of inadequate agency resources and other 
persistent barriers to reliably monitoring regulatory compliance.”56) Of 
course, there are obvious pitfalls to avoid, including concerns about auditor 
independence and competence.57) But careful program design can 
ameliorate problems.58)
These approaches by no means exhaust the array of innovative 
enforcement techniques. In one recent study, for instance, food safety 
inspectors working alone were compared with inspectors who had been 
assigned to do joint inspections.59) This simple technique resulted in an 
increase of detected violations and greater uniformity between inspectors.60) 
Another innovation is to use social media to identify places in need of 
inspection, a technique that seems feasible using data mining techniques.61) 
Environment 111 (2015), available at ssrn.com/abstract=2676856.
54) See Paul Meerman and Martin Bree, Compliance Assurance Through Company 
Compliance Management Systems, in Paddock and Wetnz, supra note 3, at 301, 311. 
55) For an extensive discussion of this option, see of Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing 
Private Regulation, 3 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 291 (2014).
56) Id. at 297. 
57) Id. at 309.
58) Id. at 400-411.
59) See Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 Stan. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming).
60) Id.
61) As two scholars explain:
[I]nspections do not have to be random. Suppose Instead that you were to base 
the likelihood of inspection on evidence from Yelp reviews. Perhaps you would 
start with a search on Yelp for terms like “sick” or “dirty”; you would probably 
find a few culprits. But a predictive algorithm would “learn” from the history of 
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It is heartening that compliance issues are beginning to get the attention 
they deserve, but there is clearly a need for more rigorous evaluation of the 
effectiveness of compliance strategies.
III. Creative Implementation
Implementation shortfalls involve lagging behind statutory obligations 
through delays or compliance failures. In contrast, creative implementation 
involves establishing remedies parallel to the statutory mandate or 
sometimes even remedies that are more vigorous. These are less 
widespread but still a significant part of the U.S. environmental law 
program. Section A surveys some of the most notable examples of creative 
implementation, while section B discusses some of the pitfalls and methods 
for courts to control possible agency excesses.
Adapting a statute to deal with new problems or changing 
circumstances, and incorporating improved methods of achieving goals, is 
essential to proper implementation of statutes.  The legislature cannot 
anticipate all of the developments that may affect achievement of a law’s 
goals.  Generally, the experts who are involved in implementing the law are 
more likely to have the deep knowledge required to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  Thus, there are real benefits to creative implementation, 
whereby the statute responds organically to changes in experience and 
knowledge.
In order to preserve the rule of law, however, this adaptation must take 
place within definite limits.  Statutory language often has flexibility that 
allows an agency to act in ways that are consistent with the goals of the 
legislature, even if the legislature had different expectations about how the 
statute would be implemented.  But implementation cannot be allowed to 
reviews and history inspection outcomes, and then predict the likelihood of 
finding violations based on more recent reviews. Inspectors could then be 
reallocated to restaurants that are most likely to have violations.
Edward L. Glaeser, Scott Duke Kominers, Michael Luca and Nikhil Naik, Big Data and Big 
Cities: the Promises and Limitations of Improved Measures for Urban Life (Dec. 2015), available at 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/Index.aspx.
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violate the clear meaning of the statute or to run counter to the goals of the 
legislature. It remains legitimate, however, when it respects both the 
boundaries of the statutory language and the purposes of legislation. 
Indeed, being completely literal about implementing legislation or refusing 
to exercise any creativity is a good way to undermine the statute.  Being 
faithful to the legislature’s purpose sometimes requires responding to 
unexpected developments or new possibilities.  
1. Examples of Creative Implementation
Creative implementation falls uneasily between compliance and 
noncompliance. By definition, it does not follow the apparent thrust of the 
underlying mandate. But it may have at least some colorable legal validity, 
and where even that is lacking, Congress sometimes steps in after the fact 
to provide its imprimatur. 
The Endangered Species Act provides a notable example of creative 
implementation. As originally enacted, the statute was an all-but-absolute 
ban on destruction of individual members of endangered species. But this 
ban led to what seemed to be an untenable situation, in which individual 
landowners were faced with bans on development to save the last few 
members of a species, while the government seemed powerless to intervene 
at an earlier time to protect the habitat on which the species relied.
An obscure 1982 amendment proved to be the key to the solution. The 
amendment allowed the Secretary of the Interior to issue a permit to “take” 
members of an endangered species (for example, by modifying their 
habitat), provided that the taking is incidental to the project; all possible 
mitigation measures are used; and there will be no appreciable effect on the 
prospects of the species for survival.62) Although this amendment seemed 
very narrow, it has served as the basis for a new approach to protecting 
endangered species that focuses on the most common cause of 
endangerment, habitat destruction. Habitat conservation plans (HCPs) 
based on this provision have become widespread, with one study 
identifying 208 plans covering anything from half an acre to 1.6 million 
62) Endangered Species Act §§ 10(a)(1)(B); 10(a)(2); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1539(a)(1)(B), 1539(a)(2).
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acres, and having durations ranging from seven months to a century.63)
Creative implementation can also be found in the enforcement process. 
EPA has created a new enforcement remedy, the Supplemental 
Environmental Project (SEP). An SEP is an environmentally desirable 
measure that a violator agrees to implement in place of some of the penalty 
that it would otherwise be legally required to pay. From 2005-2011, about 
$220 million worth of SEPs were reported.64) Still, SEPs are used in only 
about a tenth of settlements, and the rate has declined since 1995 because of 
tough restrictions on their use.65) EPA has recently updated its SEP policy to 
clarify its priorities in agreeing to projects, including climate change among 
other priority goals.66) In another creative use of the settlement process, EPA 
has used settlements as the occasion to upgrade monitoring. For instance, 
in a case involving a British Petroleum oil refinery facility, the settlement 
required BP to spend $2 million to install a fence-line emissions monitoring 
system and post the results online.67) 
EPA has also found creative solutions in the context of rulemaking. An 
63) Peter Kareiva et al., Using Science in Habitat Conservation Plans (1998), available at 
http://ww.w.carmelacanzonieri.com/library/6108-LandscapeEcoPlanning/Kareiva-UsingSc
ienceInHabitatConservationPlans.pdf. Some other voluntary programs were arguably less 
successful, such as EPA’s “performance track” program, which sought to reward companies 
with strong compliance records.
64) EPA Inspector General Examines Trends in Agency Enforcement Results, 23 Air Pollution 
Consultant 1.1 (2013). Note that the total monetary penalties and mandated compliance 
expenses in EPA enforcement actions totaled an average of about $10 billion per year during 
the same period.
65) Brooke E. Robertson, Expanding the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects,86 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 1025, 1035-36 (2009).
66) 
Though no single type or focus of a project is mandated by the Updated 
Policy, EPA appears to have a strong preference for projects that promote 
environmental justice, address climate change, and/or promote technological 
advances in pollution reduction or compliance assurance. Of those, only the 
express inclusion of climate change as an SEP target area represents a new 
development; EPA has long emphasized SEPs as a means of addressing 
environmental justice concerns and of proving and expanding the use of pollution 
reduction and compliance tools.
Colin G. Van Dyke, A Few Thoughts on EPA’s Updated SEP Policy, Nat. Resources & Env’t, 
Winter 2016, at 50, 51.
67) Giles, supra note 46, at 15.
 The Implementation Gap in Environmental Law   |  21No. 1: 2016
important example of creative implementation in rulemaking is found in 
EPA v. EME Homer City Generator, L.P.68) The case involved the “good 
neighbor” provision of the Clean Air Act, which deals with the problem of 
interstate air pollution.69) The problem faced by EPA was how to allocate 
emission cuts when multiple states contributed to a violation of air quality 
standards in a downwind state. The statute directs EPA to ensure that 
upwind emissions are controlled, but does not mention compliance costs 
and could be read to require that the resulting emission cuts be divided 
proportionally between states. EPA adopted a two-stage process to set each 
upwind state’s obligations, first identifying states that contributed 
“significantly” to downwind violations,70) and then determining how much 
each state could reduce its emissions at a cost that EPA viewed as 
reasonable.71) 
The Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s approach in an opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg that emphasized EPA’s authority to creatively address regulatory 
problems. “Lacking a dispositive statutory instruction to guide it, EPA’s 
decision, we conclude, is a ‘reasonable’ way of filling the ‘gap left open by 
68) 134 S. Ct. 1584. The EME Homer facility was a major source of interstate air pollution 
in its own right:
For more than 40 years, Homer City has spewed sulfur dioxide from two of its 
three units completely unchecked, and still does because it is largely exempt from 
federal air pollution laws passed years after it was built in 1969. Last year, the 
facility released 114,245 tons of sulfur dioxide, more than all of the power plants in 
neighboring New York combined.
“It is an emblem, a poster child of the challenge of interstate air pollution,” 
said Lem Srolovic, the head of the environmental protection bureau for the New 
York Attorney General’s office, in an interview with The Associated Press.
Dina Cappielo and Kevin Befos, After Decades, Dirty Power Plant to get Clean (May 2014), 
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-decades-dirty-power-plant-get-clean. As the 
title of that article indicates, the plant finally planned to install scrubbers, one of the last plants 
in the country to do so. Id.
69) The “good neighbor” provision requires each state implementation plan to prevent 
any source within its borders from “contributing significantly” to nonattainment in any other 
state. 
70) Id.
71) EME Homer v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Congress’.”72) In the Court’s view, EPA’s choice “makes good sense,” 
providing “an efficient and equitable solution to the allocation problem the 
Good Neighbor Provision requires the Agency to address.”73) The Court 
praised EPA for finding a cost-effective solution74) and praised the solution 
as fair because it imposed heavier burdens on laggard states.75) In dissent, 
Justice Scalia complained that the agency was straying far beyond the 
statutory language.76) 
Another example of creative implementation is provided by the federal 
government’s approach to protecting headwater streams.77) The Clean 
Water Act establishes a permit program for dredging and filling, which is 
normally applied to wetlands. But the program has evolved over time and 
is now often applied to small streams at the top of watersheds. The 
regulatory approach now features lower thresholds for regulation and 
permitting for activities on those streams, as well as a requirement for 
compensatory mitigation when small streams are impaired (meaning that 
corresponding improvements must be made in other streams). This is a 
notably creative transformation of the statute’s prior focus on wetlands, 
though they too remain subject to regulation.
Probably the most important example of creative implementation has 
been the use of the Clean Air Act to address climate change, although the 
statute was based long before climate change had become a major public 
concern.78) The state of California made the first effort to use the Act by 




76) Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77) This account is drawn from Dave Owen, Little Streams and the Continuing 
Transformation of Environmental Law (2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2773897. 
78) For pro and con commentary about this development, see Andrew Rudalevige, Old 
Laws, New Meanings: Obama’s Brand of Presidential “Imperialism”, 66 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (2016); 
Holly Doremus and Robert Infelise, Foreword, 41 Ecology L.Q. 171, 174 (2014). As Doremus 
and Infelise explain in introducing a review of recent environmental law decisions: 
The second theme that emerges this year is the challenges posed by the need to 
address new environmental problems using old statutes developed in a very 
different context. Environmental lawyers are keenly aware that changes in 
circumstances, societal values, and scientific understanding often call for changes 
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exercising its special statutory authority to control emissions from new 
vehicles.79) California was also one of the group of states that successfully 
sued EPA to force it to regulate tailpipe emissions of greenhouse gases on a 
national basis, culminating in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.80) Meanwhile, California had been sued by car 
manufacturers and others arguing that it had overstepped its authority 
under the statute. 
What followed was an enlightening exercise in creative implementation, 
as recounted by a scholar who had actively participated in the events as a 
member of the White House staff. After intense bargaining involving the 
industry, the state of California, and the White House, the stakeholders 
agreed to a deal, including the following proposed regulation:
As part of a negotiated agreement to support this program, all 
the major foreign and domestic auto companies signed letters of 
commitment promising not to challenge the new standards in 
court.... The state of California, represented by the Governor, the 
Attorney General, and the Chair of the California Air Resources 
Board (“CARB”) also agreed to support the new national program 
by treating compliance with the joint federal standards as 
compliance with California’s separate GHG standards for cars and 
trucks.
In addition, the auto companies and their trade associations 
committed not to contest any grant of a waiver of federal 
preemption under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) authorizing 
in law. But legislatures can be slow to respond, with the current legislative 
paralysis in the U.S. Congress providing an extreme example. When legislative 
changes fail to keep up with conditions, environmental advocates find themselves 
forced to address modern problems with laws not designed for those problems. 
The resulting difficulties are most familiar in connection with application of the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) to greenhouse gas emissions.
Id. at 174.
79) The statutory mandate is A.B. 1493, also called the Pavley Act, which requires the 
state to issue regulations achieving the “maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions” from vehicles. Cal. Health & Safety Code §433018.5(a).
80) 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
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California’s GHG standards for Model Years 2009-2016, and to stay 
and ultimately dismiss more than a dozen pending lawsuits 
challenging California’s legal authority to regulate GHGs.
Thus, the joint rule, once final, would effectively create a uniform 
federal system for regulating fuel efficiency and controlling GHG 
pollution in a significant part of the U.S transportation sector.81)
This story may have implications for other regulatory efforts: “although 
in some respects the car deal was unique, much of its innovation can be 
replicated, including the use of joint rulemaking or similar uniformity-
promoting mechanisms, along with extralegal tools like commitment letters 
that can memorialize agreements and specify implementation plans.”82)
The first EPA effort to extend the regulatory regime from vehicles to 
stationary sources like power plants utilized a section of the Clean Air Act 
that was originally designed to maintain existing air quality in areas that 
already have clean air, rather than letting the air in those areas deteriorate.83) 
It applies to any “major emitting facility” constructed in an area that is in 
compliance with air quality standards for any major pollutant. Under this 
provision, each such major emitter must use the “best available control 
technology [BACT] for each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter emitted from, or which results from, such facility.” 
In applying this provision to greenhouse gases, EPA was faced with two 
major coverage issues. First, what facilities does the statute cover? Second, 
once a facility is covered for whatever reason, are greenhouse gases among 
the pollutants for which BACT is required? 
The first question is troubling because of the way the statutory coverage 
requirements would apply to sources that emit CO2 but not significant 
amounts of other pollutants. Under the statutory language, a source is 
covered by BACT if it emits or has the potential to emit a specified quantity 
of “any pollutant” -- 100 tons per year if in certain industries and 250 tons 
81) Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car 
Deal”, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 343, 345-46 (2011).
82) Id. at 374.
83) 42 U.S. § 7475(a).
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otherwise.84) While 250 tons per year is a large amount of most conventional 
pollutants, there are a huge number of relatively small sources that emit 
that much CO2. EPA believed that it would be completely impractical to 
apply the BACT requirement to all of those facilities. It therefore adopted a 
“tailoring rule,” which limited coverage of BACT to facilities that emitted 
much larger amounts of greenhouse gases (at least 75,000 tons per year). 
This left the second question: whether facilities covered because of their 
emissions of other pollutants (so-called “anyway” sources) had to use 
BACT for greenhouse gases. An example would be a factory that emitted 
more than 250 tons of nitrogen oxides per year. Again the agency answered 
yes. Here the statutory language was clearer. 
The Supreme Court approved only one of EPA’s coverage decisions in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA [UARG];85) the Court rejected EPA’s 
effort to cover sources solely on the basis of their CO2 emissions (as well as 
the resulting rewrite of the numerical standards) but upheld its coverage of 
“anyway” sources. Notably, the four liberal Justices on the Supreme Court 
dissented and would have upheld EPA’s approach in its entirety.
The UARG decision did not have a dramatic impact on the effectiveness 
of the PSD rules, because at least 85% of greenhouse gases come from 
“anyway” facilities. The ruling did raise some serious concerns, however, 
about how open the Court will be to EPA’s efforts to adapt other portions 
of the Clean Air Act to greenhouse gases. But it may be a mistake to read 
too much into the majority opinion. The effort to rewrite the numerical 
limits in the statute was an unusually aggressive legal move by EPA, which 
even some sympathetic observers thought was very risky. Yet without the 
rewrite, the expansion of BACT to include plants solely on the basis of their 
CO2 emissions was untenable. The Court’s rejection of this effort may not 
mean that it will reject EPA positions that do not appear to entail such 
direct collisions with statutory language.
EPA more recently issued standards covering emissions of greenhouse 
84) CAA § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1).
85) 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). For commentary on the decision, see Jody Freeman, Why I 
Worry About UARG, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 9 (2015); William W. Buzbee, Anti-Regulatory 
Skewing and Political Choice in UARG, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 63 (2015).
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gases from new electric power generators.86) In order to regulate existing 
power plants – especially existing coal-fired plants – EPA turned to a 
previously obscure and rarely used provision of the statute.87) Once it has 
issued a standard for new sources in the same category, that provision 
empowers EPA to require states to submit plans to control emissions from 
existing plants, but the provision applies only to emissions that are not 
otherwise regulated by the statute (which is why it has been so rarely used). 
If a state fails to submit a plan, EPA must submit its own enforceable plans 
for that state. The plans are supposed to be based on the standard of 
performance for the industry – that is, the best “system of continuous 
emission reduction” that has been “adequately demonstrated” in terms of 
existing plants in that state. 
A crucial issue arises concerning the scope of the term “system” – does 
it include only pollution reduction techniques at a single plant, or could a 
system be defined more broadly to involve the relationships between 
multiple plants? EPA took the broader approach. It determined that the 
best system of emission reduction for existing units consisted of three 
building blocks: (1) efficiency improvements in coal-fired plants, (2) 
substitution of natural gas generation for coal-fired generation when 
feasible, and (3) increased use of renewables. 
To uphold building blocks 2 and 3, EPA will have to fend off arguments 
that the “system” of control cannot include “beyond the fence line” 
measures such as shifts in electricity production between generating 
facilities. Defining the system of pollution control to encompass changes in 
the amount of electricity introduced into the grid is a departure for EPA, 
which normally defines it as a type of pollution control equipment at the 
specific emitting facility. In effect, EPA is treating all the power generators 
on the state grid as part of a single unified source. This makes a certain 
amount of sense because of the way the grid operates – it has been called 
the world’s most complicated machine – because of the practicalities of 
controlling carbon. But it may be too innovative for courts to accept.88)
86) The action was taken pursuant to §111 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7411.
87) 42 U.S.C. §7411(d).
88) The Supreme Court unexpectedly issued an order postponing the plan even though 
the case had not yet been considered fully by the lower court. See Erin Ryan, The Clean Power 
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Due to the outcome of the U.S. Presidential election in 2016, the fate of 
the Clean Power Plan is even more uncertain. The Trump Administration 
may attempt to withdraw the rule or help defeat it in the courts. No doubt 
the new Administration will also attempt to use the flexibility in the 
environmental laws, but for different purposes than the last President. If 
that flexibility is used to pursue the environmental goals of the statutes in 
new ways, it may be constructive and creative. But if flexibility is used to 
sabotage the purposes of the law or if the Administration violates the clear 
language of the statutes, it will be up to the courts to uphold the integrity of 
the law.
2. Judicial Supervision of Creative Implementation
There are limits to the degree of creative implementation that the courts 
will allow in the interests of maintaining the paramount role of the 
legislature in setting regulatory policy. One example is the UARG case 
discussed above. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court captures the judicial 
attitude to agency innovations that stretch the governing statute to the 
breaking point:
We conclude that EPA’s rewriting of the statutory thresholds 
was impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency’s 
interpretation of the triggering provisions. An agency has no power 
to “tailor” legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting 
unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise discretion only in 
the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must 
always “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.” It is hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous 
than the precise numerical thresholds at which the Act requires … 
permitting. When EPA replaced those numbers with others of its 
own choosing, it went well beyond the “bounds of its statutory 
Plan, the Supreme Court’s Stay, and Irreparable Harm (2016), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2759076; Lisa Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab (2016); 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2737441.
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authority.”89)
Indeed, the Court saw EPA’s action as implicating major constitutional 
principles:
Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in the 
Tailoring Rule, we would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s 
separation of powers. Under our system of government, Congress 
makes laws and the President, acting at times through agencies like 
EPA, “faithfully execute[s]” them. The power of executing the laws 
necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to resolve 
some questions left open by Congress that arise during the law’s 
administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear 
statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice.90) 
Another opinion by Justice Scalia reflects a similar effort to rein in what 
the majority considered to be overly aggressive implementation by EPA. 
Michigan v. EPA91) involved a special provision dealing with toxic emissions 
from power plants.92) Although toxic emissions from other categories of 
sources are covered under other portions of the same section based on 
health considerations,93) the subsection dealing with power plants takes a 
different approach. It requires EPA to conduct several studies and reports 
to Congress, and then to determine whether it was “necessary and 
appropriate” to regulate power plants taking into consideration the 
findings of a study focused on health effects. EPA concluded that the 
89) UARG, 134 S.Ct. at 2445.
90) Id. at 3446.
91) 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015).
92) 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). This subsection requires EPA to “perform a study of the 
hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric 
utility steam generating units” from toxic pollutants despite additional controls already 
required by other provisions of the statute. Id. EPA is then instructed to report on the study to 
Congress, along with a discussion of “alternative control strategies for emissions.” Finally, 
and most importantly, EPA “shall regulate electricity utility steam generating units under this 
section, if [it] finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results 
of the study required by this subparagraph.” Id.
93) 135 S. Ct. at 2705. 
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statute was ambiguous but that it was reasonable to interpret it to exclude 
consideration of cost in making the “necessary and appropriate” finding.94) 
A closely divided Supreme Court held that the agency’s interpretation 
was unreasonable.95) This passage seems to be key to the Court’s reasoning:
One would not say that it is even rational, never mind 
“appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in 
return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. In 
addition, “cost” includes more than the expense of complying with 
regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost. EPA’s 
interpretation precludes the Agency from considering any type of 
cost— including, for instance, harms that regulation might do to 
human health or the environment.96)
Justice Scalia then continued that “[t]here are undoubtedly settings in 
which the phrase “appropriate and necessary” does not encompass cost. 
But this is not one of them.”97) 
These were closely divided judicial decisions; obviously, some Justices 
disagreed with the view that EPA had violated its statutory mandate. But 
no one disagreed with the view that it was up to the courts, ultimately, to 
make that decision and control overzealousness by the agency. Otherwise, 
agencies would be free to rewrite the laws, rather than taking their proper 
subordinate role of the legislature. It is one thing to use legal creativity in 
order to exploit the flexibility in a law to better achieve the legislature’s 
goal. It is another thing to ignore clear statutory language or to exploit 
flexibility in order to defeat the legislature’s goals.  
Flexibility can be used for either good purposes or bad ones. Apart from 
the rule of law concern, this second problem with creative implementation 
is that it could actually be used to undermine statutory goals. Similar 
94) 135 S. Ct. at 2706. 
95) The four dissenters, lead by Justice Kagan, contended that EPA had made adequate 
provision for cost considerations at later points of the regulatory process. Michigan v. EPA, 
135 S. Ct. at 2714 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrent to 
reiterate his argument for overruling Chevron. 135 S.Ct. at 2712.
96) 135 S. Ct. at 2699. 
97) Id. 
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concerns have been raised about adaptive management for natural 
resources,98) in which agencies experiment with policies and monitor the 
results rather than adopting rigid rules.99) This problem cannot be tackled 
by the courts directly, since they are in no position to make independent 
judgments about what regulatory programs are likely to work. But courts 
can at least use the “arbitrary and capricious” standard to ensure that the 
agency has taken a hard look at the problem.
IV. Conclusion
It is hard to imagine any environmental lawyer dismissing 
noncompliance as an unimportant problem or suggesting that the 
implementation of environmental statutes has generally followed a 
straightforward path. As we have seen, the linkage between statutory 
requirements and implementation is far from automatic: specific ground-
level decisions may take place in the absence of standards (though under 
threat of future standards or potential liability), or in some negotiated 
deviation from the standards. Thus, rather than focusing on regulatory 
standards in isolation, we need to see them as part of a larger process of 
negotiation between government actors, industry, and environmentalists. 
Recognizing the quantity of implementation issues might change how 
we approach the procedures for issuing standards. If we expect standards 
to be completely implemented, it makes sense to insist on full deliberation 
and a high standard of rationality when the standards are crafted. But to 
the extent that the standards function instead as opening gambits in a 
prolonged bargaining process, this insistence seems somewhat misplaced. 
Moreover, the considerable uncertainty about how a standard will actually 
be implemented naturally makes any confident assessment of the 
regulation before issuance problematic, arguing for a more dynamic 
approach to assessing and modifying regulations over time. 
98) For a discussion of specific legal changes designed to promote adaptive management, 
see Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 Akron L. Rev. 933, 
938-39 (2013).
99) See id. at 940.
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Given Congress’s often-unrealistic demands, it is hard to see how the 
system could operate if the government attempted perfect implementation 
– for instance, Congress called for an end to all water pollution by 1985, 
which was not remotely possible.100) Besides ameliorating the sometimes 
unrealistic demands found in the statutes, the implementation process has 
also provided opportunity for some important innovations in environmental 
regulation. 
Even when they produce useful results, mismatches between imple-
mentation and statutes also risk doing damage to our concept of the rule of 
law. Widespread noncompliance with formally binding requirements 
undermines the concept that good citizens ― and even more so, govern-
mental officials ― obey the law. For this reason, as much as it may be 
socially beneficial in some of its guises, creative implementation needs to be 
held within a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. 
Implementation issues deserve particular attention now, at the time 
when we are entering a new era of environmental regulation: the Climate 
Change Era. When we design measures to prevent climate change, it is not 
enough to set good goals or to proclaim new standards. We must pay very 
careful attention to how those standards will be enforced. We must also 
design regulations that are easy to create and enforce.101) Finally, because 
climate change has such broad impacts, it may well require creative imple-
mentation of existing statutes in order to deal with all of its ramifications.
Implementation issues may in part be because of the sheer difficulty of 
regulating many different environmental problems at many different 
facilities across a large, diverse country. Those difficulties, although real, 
are susceptible to solutions with sufficient effort and ingenuity. The more 
intractable cause of implementation problems is the degree of political 
polarization about environmental problems in the United States. Such 
polarization has prevented Congress from participating actively in policy 
100) See Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1); 33 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1) (“it is the national goal that the 
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985”).
101) This is one reason that a carbon tax may be a desirable approach. Tax collection is not 
perfect either, but it is something that modern societies know how to do, and tracking 
quantities of fossil fuels is less demanding than monitoring emissions for thousands of 
sources. The broader point is that the design of regulatory policies needs to be attentive to 
potential implementation issues.
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reform, leading to mismatches between resources and agency responsib-
ilities, and disrupting cooperative relationships between federal and state 
agencies. 
Whether the U.S. can reduce the current level of polarization remains to 
be seen. But the U.S. does have other important resources to address 
statutory implementation, including a strong “rule of law” culture, sub-
stantial agency expertise, and active environmental NGOs. Thus, there is 
ground for hope in our ability to cope with the implementation gap. In the 
meantime, we can be pleased that despite the formidable challenges it faces, 
the system has achieved substantial progress toward environmental 
improvement.
